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PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Donald J. Tate*
Some 180 of the estimated 1,0001 appellate decisions of the
1965-66 term dealt at least in part with questions of civil pro-
cedure. As part of the first coat of judicial gloss on the still new
Code of Civil Procedure, nearly all have some immediate signifi-
cance. Thus the following selection can doubtlessly be viewed
as more than a little arbitrary. It must suffice to say of the
remaining great bulk of these decisions that en masse they sig-
nify that the Code does indeed mean what it says and that the
judiciary is not at all disposed to seize upon a word here and a
phrase there to achieve some purpose alien to its underlying
structure and philosophy. This attitude bespeaks a respect for
the redactors' work which ranks among the finer tributes to the
memory of the late Professor Henry George McMahon, whose
contributions to these pages the writer is under no illusion of
being able to replace.
JURISDICTION
In Fidelity Credit Co. v. Bradford,2 the Third Circuit held
that our state courts had no "jurisdiction over the person" of a
foreign corporation which had neither agent nor office here but
shipped appliances to Louisiana retailers for uncontrolled resale.
The action against it for damages arose from a consumer pur-
chase and appliance defect but was not the usual "products lia-
bility" claim. The principal relief sought was rescission of the
sale and the cost of repairing the installation site. Otherwise,
our statute aimed at foreign manufacturers whose products
cause injury here would almost certainly have been applied to
the opposite result.3 Viewed this way, the decision is question-
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF TIlE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA, ANNUAL
REPORT, Tables I and IV (1965).
2. 177 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), writs refused, 248 La. 430, 179
So.2d 273 (1965).
3. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (1964) : "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a non-resident .. . as to a cause of action arising from the non-resident's . . .
causing injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi-offense committed
through an act or omission outside of this state if he . . . derives substantial
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able, for the constitutional question should hardly turn on such a
distinction and, without the distinction, one must conclude either
that the legislature failed in its attempt to exhaust the constitu-
tional power potential in this area 4 or, in products liability cases,
exceeded it.
In Eden v. Johnson,5 the Second Circuit Court treated the
statute" authorizing constructive seizure of immovables by ap-
propriate recordation of notice of seizure as not merely au-
thorizing but requiring that procedure in a seizure of an heir's
interest in a succession having several heirs. The heir's interest
was "insusceptible ... of actual seizure and possession"7 and the
non-complying nonresident attachment was dissolved. Before
constructive seizure by recordation was authorized outside the
parishes of Orleans and Jefferson, the then Second Circuit Court
had upheld a nonresident attachment of much the same kind as
that here dissolved." The late Professor McMahon viewed the
new procedure as an "additional mode of seizure to an actual
seizure,"9 however, and if the categories of "actual seizure" and
"constructive seizure (in the sense of the statute)" are exhaus-
tive, the procedure is indeed mandatory "whenever a party...
desires to have the sheriff . . . make a constructive seizure of
immovable property."'10
VENUE
The principle that one must usually be sued at his domicile
is deeply embedded in our law. 1' In workmen's compensation
litigation, however, venue at plaintiff's domicile 12 has gradually
been accepted. This reversal of tradition is probably traceable
to considerations of the convenience and resources of the typical
parties to such suits in a highly mobile population. Those who,
revenue from goods used or consumed . . . in this state." But see Student Sym-
posium, Personal Jurisdiction, 26 LA. L. REV. 350, 398, 407 (1966).
4. See Comments of Louisiana State Law Institute-1964 under LA. R.S.
AN.N. 13:3201 (Supp. 1964).
5. 176 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
6. LA. R.S. 13:3851-3861 (Supp. 1960).
7. 176 So. 2d 476, 478 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
8. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Drexler, 171 So. 151 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1936).
9. McMahon, Explanatory Note to LSA-R.S. 13:3851 thlrough 13:3861, 7 LA.
R.S. ANN. 47 (Supp. 1966).
10. LA. R.S. 13:3851 (Supp. 1960).
11. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDuaE art. 42 (1960) ; La. Code of Practice art.
162 (1870).
12. LA. R.S. 23:1312, 1313, 1271 (1950) ; but see LA. R.S. 23:1311 (1950)
(employer-defendant).
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for similar reasons, hope for a similar turn in all personal injury
litigation should now look beyond article 74 of the Code, per-
mitting suit "in the parish where the damages were sustained."
In Coursey v. White,13 the Fourth Circuit Court held that one
who suffers mental anguish, loss of reputation, and damage to
his credit standing in one parish through a wrongful seizure of
his property in another may not sue in the former as "the parish
where the damages were sustained." The case is noted else-
where. 14 Although carefully confined to the facts presented, the
opinion is certainly a straw in the wind. But the hopes pinned
on article 74 were probably foredoomed anyway - a literal in-
terpretation would allow too much, as the court noted, con-
vincingly.
ACTIONS
Dickson v. SandefurI5 is destined to become standard fare in
the law schools, a classic introduction to Cumulation of Actions
and Joinder of Parties. The Red River cut a new channel through
plaintiff's property, leaving him its abandoned bed "by way of
indemnification."' 6 Plaintiff's eighteen possessory actions for
eighteen possessory disturbances against the eighteen owners of
eighteen separate tracts fronting on the old channel were insti-
tuted in one suit. The trial court sustained exceptions of im-
proper joinder of parties and improper cumulation of actions.
The Second Circuit Court reversed. Its opinion leaves nothing
to be desired as the jurisprudential capstone to the long struggle
for clarity on this subject, beginning with Gill v. City of Lake
Charles" in 1907 and culminating in the articles 461-465. Of the
"community of interest" required for the cumulation, the court
observed that "each defendant has a common interest in the
judicial settlement of the questions raised herein affecting either
the claims by plaintiffs or with respect to his own property
rights."'18 Should any defendant convert the possessory action
against him to a petitory action by him, "the court is authorized
under Article 465 to segregate and to try the converted action
separately."' 9 It seems simple now.
13. 184 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
14. Note, 27 LA. L. REV. 76 (1966).
15. 181 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), writs refused, 248 La. 906, 182
So.2d 660 (1966).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 518 (1870).
17. 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907). See also Preliminary Statement, ch. 2, tit.
2, bk. 1, LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1960).
18. 181 So. 2d 75, 78-79 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
19. Id. at 79.
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Relief beyond the prayer is authorized by article 862.20 In
the last term the courts granted relief outside the parties' ex-
press demands, in quasi-contract for unauthorized repairs in one
case,21 and by way of declaratory judgment in an action for a
monied judgment in another.22 Admirable as this procedural
liberality may be, there remain in other contexts the interesting
theoretical problems of reconciling article 862 with article 425
on splitting the cause of action by demanding only "a portion of
the obligation, ' 23 article 861 on specific alleging of "special dam-
age," -2 4 and Civil Code article 2286, on res judicata. 25
SERVICE OF PLEADINGS
Normand Co. v. Abraham2 may hold that a contradictory
motion cannot be served under article 1313,27 typically by mail
on counsel, but must be served by the sheriff under article 1314.28
If so, it seems wrong and full of mischief. Involved was a mo-
tion for summary judgment, which need not be but was cast in
the form of a rule to show cause.2 9 Thus it literally required an
appearance, article 1313 was inapplicable, and article 1314 came
into play. But the Fourth Circuit Court went further, clearly
implying that, even if not so cast, article 1313 was inapplicable
for the doubtful reason that the motion was by nature contra-
dictory and required a hearing eventually.3 ° Such a rule would
be unfortunate, first, because it would require much expense for
unneeded official service, and, second, because its facile adminis-
tration would require a more certain distinction between ex parte
20. "[A] final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings .... "
21. Brooks v. Britnell, 183 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
22. Gibbs v. Giering, 183 So. 2d 459 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
23. "An obligee cannot divide an obligation for the purpose of bringing separate
actions on different portions thereof. If he brings an action to enforce only a por-
tion of the obligation, and does not demand the enforcement of the full obligation,
he shall lose his right to enforce the remaining portion."
24. "When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically
alleged."
25. "The thing demanded must be the same . Compare Brooks v. Britnell,
183 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966) and Hayes v. Muller, 248 La. 934, 183
So.2d 310 (1966).
26. 176 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
27. "A pleading which requires no appearance or answer . . . may be served
by . . . mailing a copy thereof to the adverse party . . . or to his counsel of
record . .. ."
28. "A pleading which is required to be served, but which may not be mailed
or delivered under Article 1313, shall be served by the sheriff .... "
29. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 963, comment (b) (1960).
30. 176 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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and contradictory motions than the Code or the jurisprudence
provides.31 If the decision means merely that all rules to show
cause must be served by the sheriff, it is a correct and important
reminder to the practice that frugality dictates avoidance of that
optional form of motion. It should mean no more.
PLEADINGS'
Several decisions of the term suggest a need for eventual
improvement of the means of presenting defenses in our pro-
cedure. In Venterella v. Pace,32 the use of motions for summary
judgment for peremptory exceptions of prescription called for
nothing but gentle reproof of the pleaders. In Public Fin. Corp.
v. Vice,3 3 the use of the peremptory exception of no right of ac-
tion for the affirmative defense of discharge in bankruptcy was
held improper. In Gebbia v. New Orleans,3 4 the use of the
peremptory exception of no right of action for the dilatory ex-
ception to the procedural capacity of a wife asserting a com-
munity right was approved and then condemned, ultimately re-
quiring an overruling of prior decisions. In a system codifying
the principle that "rules of procedure implement the substantive
law and are not an end in themselves," 35 it seems unfortunate
that the resources of the judiciary must be spent on such mat-
ters. Pride in the 1960 procedural revision should not prevent a
candid discussion of the problem such needless effort suggests.
The code definitions of the declinatory, dilatory, and peremp-
tory exceptions, carried over from the 1870 code, are not precise.
The distinctions attempted between retarding, dismissing, and
defeating an action - and between declining jurisdiction, re-
tarding the action's progress, and having the action declared
legally non-existent or barred by effect of law - refer in part
to unfamiliar and ill-defined effects of judgments sustaining
exceptions. 6 Moreover, the illustrations given of each exception,
while helpful, are sometimes incompatible with the definitions;
for example, the question of venue is not one of jurisdiction37
31. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 963 (1960).
32. 180 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), writs refused, 248 La. 796, 182
So. 2d 73 (1966).
33. 177 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
34. 181 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), reversed, 249 La. 409, 187 So. 2d
423 (1966).
35. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 5051 (1960).
36. Id. art. 921, 923.
37. Id. art. 925.
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and that of non-joinder, not one of defeating the action or de-
claring it barred and non-existent. 38 Furthermore, certain ob-
jections can be presented through two exceptions (prematur-
ity), 39 others either by exception or by affirmative defense or
reconventional demand in the answer (compromise as res judi-
cata, compensation) ,40 and most through the motion for sum-
mary judgment, 41 questions of evidence aside. The well-estab-
lished principle4 2 that the averments and evident purpose of the
pleading, not its required designation, 43 determines its character,
solves many of the problems thus created, but not all of them.
The danger of waiver or "stage-preclusion"4 4 of an objection
presentable only through the dilatory or declinatory exception;
the risk of much wasted motion in treating the peremptory ex-
ception as the proper vehicle for a defense presentable only in
the answer by way of affirmative defense; and the difficulty
of fitting the omni-competent 45 motion for summary judgment
into the exception system - all create an unfortunate need to
smear several pleadings on the record to make sure that a single
defense has been properly pleaded. In the famous Harvey case,46
for example (holding a release of one tortfeasor with reserva-
tion of rights against another to absolve the latter of liability
for the other's virile share), the released third-party defendant
quite prudently saw fit to file an exception of no cause of action,
a "plea" of res judicata, a "plea" of compromise, and a motion
for summary judgment to present his single defense. Apparently
the latter would have sufficed, but so apparently would have an
exception of no right of action - or the affirmative defense of
"extinguishment of the obligation. '47
38. Id. art. 927.
39. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 423, comment (b) (1960).
40. See L.A. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1005, comment (b) (1960) (com-
pensation); Bowden v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 150 So. 2d 655
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1963) (transaction or compromise as res judicata).
41. The motion for summary judgment permits either party to seek "all or
part of the relief for which he has prayed," seemingly without restriction. LA.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 966 (1960). But see text at note 30 supra.
42. Succession of Smith, 247 La. 921, 175 So. 2d 269 (1965).
43. "Every pleading shall contain ... a designation of the pleading." LA. CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 853 (1960).
44. A highly sophisticated approach and terminology appears in MILLAR, THE
FORMATIVE PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE (Continental Legal History Series, Millar transl. 1927) ("sequence,"
"stage-preclusion," and "contingent cumulation").
45. See note 41 supra. But sec Venterella v. Pace, 180 So. 2d 240 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1965), writs refused, 248 La. 796, 182 So. 2d 73 (1966).
46. Harvey r. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
47. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 927, 1005 (1960).
19671
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure48 provide an interesting
contrast. Essentially, all defenses and objections may be pre-
sented in the answer in that system, with wide judicial discre-
tion for the separate and preliminary trial of any issue. This
achieves the evident purpose of our system's creation of special
procedural vessels for various defenses, the avoidance of full-
scale trial of actions determinable on conveniently severable
issues. The federal system also relegates to judicial discretion
the problem we approach conceptualistically, the danger that the
exception will be used beyond its purpose - to try fault on an
exception to venue laid where the offense occurred ;49 or con-
curring fault on the same exception to venue laid properly as to
one joint obligor ;'o or ownership on an exception to want of in-
terest in a petitory action."1 The federal system permits a pre-
liminary assertion of a few enumerated defenses by motion, of
course, but generally allows but one such sally, without how-
ever preventing the resurrection by answer of omitted defenses
waived by the filing of that motion, except understandably in
matters of venue, personal jurisdiction, and process. Our system
of defense-pleading seems somewhat pretentious by comparison.
Take, for example, our use of two exceptions -the declinatory
and dilatory - which must be filed at the same time, tried under
the same allowances for evidence, and maintained with the same
uncertain effect,5 2 when one would do quite nicely.
Thus, while the 1960 revision spared the plaintiff any further
concern about "theory of the case" in pleading,53 it left defend-
ant in a maze of exceptions, motions, and affirmative defenses
whence he might escape only by mastering a hoary metaphysics
which a vast jurisprudence alone can supply, and then none too
clearly. Recognition of defendant's quandary should lead the
courts, pending improbable legislative action, to ignore pleading
designations ever more freely, allow ever more defenses to come
either by way of exception or answer, and permit the motion for
summary judgment to serve the purpose of ever more excep-
tions, even to the extent of liberalizing the evidentiary limita-
tions of that motion, with a view simply to:
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 12, 42; 1A BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 370 (Wright ed. 1960).
49. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 74 (1960).
50. Id. art. 73.
51. Wischer v. Madison Realty Co., 231 La. 704, 92 So. 2d 589 (1957).
52. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 928, 930, 932, 933 (1960).
53. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. art. 862, comment(b) (1960).
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(1) Facilitating the disposition of cases on conveniently sev-
erable issues without full-scale trial;
(2) Assuring plaintiff's counsel of fair notice of the way
defendant intends to support the defense on the facts;
and
(3) In matters of personal jurisdiction, venue, and process,
favoring waiver by stage preclusion on the fringes of
the case, in recognition that one court is probably as
good as another.
Perhaps this is the prevailing attitude. But then why bother, as
in Gebbia,5 4 to overrule well-established decisions that the wife
has no interest or right of action to sue unaided for the com-
munity, to hold instead that procedural capacity is what she
lacks? If that question deserved reexamination, the whole pot
of defense-vehicles is likely to continue boiling.
DISCOVERY
In 1962, the Supreme Court provided a workable solution to
the problem of obtaining information from the opponent's expert
without offending article 1452, which requires a showing of
great need for reaching his case-oriented writings and denies
access altogether to the parts of those writings reflecting his
"mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories." The
court held that the expert could be required to testify by deposi-
tion and "to bring with him his . . . memoranda which will re-
main, in his possession and under his control and will be used
only to refresh his memory so that he may answer questions in
regard to the facts." 55 In Barnett v. Barnett Enterprises,6 the
Fourth Circuit Court refused to follow this solution outside the
field of expropriation in which it arose. Both production and
interrogation are prohibited by article 1452, the court held. The
dissenter's broader view of the Supreme Court's 1962 approach
seems correct.
Mangrum v. Powell" was also an article 1452 case, holding
that defendant cannot compel production of the medical reports
54. Gebbia v. New Orleans, 181 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), reversed,
249 La. 409, 187 So. 2d 423 (1966).
55. La. Dep't of Highways v. Spruell, 243 La. 202, 214, 142 So. 2d 396, 400
(1962).
56. 182 So. 2d 728 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
57. 181 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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of plaintiff's experts, "as it is difficult to conceive of a medical
report with respect to a patient's condition without containing
an expression of the doctor's opinion."5 8 Articles 1492-1495, con-
cerning exchanges of medical reports where parties are physical-
ly examined by order under those provisions, were not involved.
The decision is also of interest to the practice in holding that
answers to interrogatories addressed to a corporation can be
signed by the attorney upon whom they are served.
TRIAL
Cheramnie v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.'9 held that defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment, filed before jury trial and
"referred to the merits," could not perform the office of the mo-
tion for directed verdict, "which is not in our law." The trial
court had granted the motion after the evidence but before sub-
mission of the case to the jury. The court of appeal explained
forcefully that "the motion is a procedural device that is to avoid
trial when there is no material issue of fact. The whole concept
and purpose of summary judgment is defeated when the motion
is referred to the merits of the case. This is exactly what the
motion is designed to avoid." 0
There remains the motion for judgment on the pleadings6 ' to
be tried as a substitute for the motion for directed verdict in our
jury trial procedure. The exception of no cause of action has
already been tried.6 2 Although the motion for judgment on the
pleadings is confined to the sufficiency of the pleadings, it is
well settled in the case of the exception of no cause of action,
similarly confined, that the evidence may be considered as an
enlargement of the pleadings.63 Perhaps the same reasoning can
be applied to the motion for judgment on the pleadings. This
approach to conforming our jury trial procedure jurisprudential-
ly to that of our sister jurisdictions offers the advantage over
the motion for summary judgment that the delays for hearings
on the motion for judgment on the pleadings are more malleable
58. Id. at 402.
59. 176 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
60. Id. at 212.
61. "Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings ..... LA. CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 965 (1960).
62. Bartholomew v. Impastato, 12 So. 2d 700 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943) ; see
Kline v. Dawson, 230 La. 901, 89 So. 2d 385 (1956) ; Williams v. Missouri Pae.
R.R., 6 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941); and Young v. Thompson, 189 So.
487 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1939).
63. See Barr v. Freeman, 175 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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and the evidence as a whole may be considered, as suggested. On
the other hand, as the court here points out, perhaps "if the con-
cept of a motion for a directed verdict is needed in our law, this
is a problem which addresses itself to the legislature."6 It would
seem better on the whole to do without that device and let the
jury-tried case reach the court of appeal as a completed whole,
and thus to avoid appeals of partially tried cases and occasional
remands to let the parties start all over again.
APPEALS
Our system of incidental demands and cumulation of actions
admits many combinations of demands, cross-demands, and con-
ditional demands which pose thorny problems of appellate proce-
dure. These problems have not received the systematic treat-
ment against which new developments might be viewed in proper
perspective. Notable among such developments have been deci-
sions on the scope of review in joint-tortfeasor cases 5 under the
answer to the appeal, which restricts appellate relief thus sought
to relief against appealing parties and ordinarily provides no
relief against other appellees. 66 Two decisions of the last term
suggest a new dimension of difficulty, the question whether or
not a judgment silent on an alternative or third-party demand
is an adjudication of that demand at all, permitting appellate re-
view of that aspect of it. Although distinguishable by jurispru-
dential standards, the decisions seem inconsistent in theory, one
from the First Circuit holding silence to be adjudication, 7 and
the other from the Supreme Court treating it as a reservation of
judgment requiring remand for adjudication of that issue. 8
For the time being, the only safe rule in multi-party cases is
"appeal." The appeal brings everything before the appellate
court that can be brought (aside from its "writ" jurisdiction).69
The less versatile answer to the appeal has been deprived by re-
cent legislation 70 of its principal utility, as the only means of de-
64. 176 So. 2d 209, 213 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
65. E.g., Vidrine v. Simoneaux, 145 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
Emmons v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 245 La. 411, 158 So. 2d 594 (1963), reversing
150 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Fussell v. United States F. & G., 153
So. 2d 911 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
66. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2087, comment(c) (1962).
67. Breaux v. Texas and Pac. R.R., 176 So. 2d 640 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965),
writs refused, 248 La. 375, 178 So. 2d 660 (1965), motion to remand denied, 182
So. 2d 552 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
68. McCoy v. Pacific Coast Fire Ins. Co., 248 La. 289, 178 So. 2d 761 (1965).
69. Breaux v. Laird, 230 La. 221, 88 So. 2d 33 (1956).
70. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2087 (1962).
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fense against an unexpected last minute appeal by another. The
appellee now has ten additional days from the first appeal to
appeal himself. Future developments will thus arise, not from
imperfections of appellate procedure, but from litigants' over-
sights.
EXECUTORY PROCESS
The reports are replete with evidence of unsuccessful at-
tempts to avoid the Deficiency Judgment Act,71 requiring ap-
praisement in the sale under executory process as a condition to
obtaining a judgment for the unsatisfied portion of the seizing
creditor's claim. The construction of the act has been liberal in
every sense of the word. Bickham Motors, Inc. v. Crain72 is in
that tradition. In a deficiency judgment action, the First Circuit
court held that "the seizing creditor appointed keeper who fails
to discharge the duty of protection and preservation incumbent
upon him to the extent of the value of the movables in his charge
deteriorates almost to the vanishing point, must be held in the
same position as if the sale were provoked without benefit of
appraisement." 73
MISCELLANEOUS
In Luquette v. Bouillion,74 the question presented by counsel's
unsuccessful attempt to present the deposition of a witness to
the jury by sound motion-picture film was left open. In the
writer's experience, trial courts have permitted counsel to photo-
graph for the record a witness's placement of model vehicles on
a map of the scene of the accident, and the appellate court has
retired to a projection room to view moving pictures of a work-
men's compensation claimant suspiciously hard at work. Such
not-so-futuristic tactics suggest that the appellate court of to-
morrow may have no time to review the facts, unless it refuses
to look at them.
71. LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950).
72. 185 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
73. Id. at 277,
74. 184 So. 2d 766 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
[Vol. XXVII
